Items record sign_in_with {provider, account}; the browser bridge reports it
with the site's identities and saves it after the usual app prompt. Items
now keep fields they don't know, so editing in an older app never drops what
a newer one added.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <[email protected]>
The browser bridge answers passkey_query/get/create/result/cancel: the page's
RP ID is checked against the tab origin (no public suffixes), every request
waits for the user to approve it in the app, and the extension polls for the
result. Tags are normalised on save and included in item summaries.
confirm_master_password verifies the user where there are no biometrics.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <[email protected]>
- kv-proto: email on setup, AccountInfo.email/is_admin, ServerInfo.registration, admin DTOs.
- kv-sync: prelogin by email or account id (setup QR / Emergency Kit), register with email,
set_email, /v1/admin/* client calls.
- kv-ffi: register_account(code, email), login(.., email), account_details, set_account_email,
admin_create_invite. kv-wasm: the same plus the full admin API for the web vault.
- Live test: two users on one server stay isolated; a new device signs in by email.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <[email protected]>
Syncs first (fails if that sync fails, unless discard_unsynced), ends the session best effort and
wipes the local store, keeping the device identity. Refused for a vault with no server, which would
be lost. Test: unsynced item survives sign-out and returns after signing in again.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <[email protected]>
VaultCore::delete_account verifies the password against the keyset (Secret Key from its sealed copy),
calls DELETE /v1/account when a server is configured (needs a session; a failure deletes nothing),
then wipes the local store and keeps only the device identity. Unit test plus a live test against a
real server.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <[email protected]>
Built with debug info, symbols extracted with dsymutil (same UUIDs), then the shipped binary stripped.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <[email protected]>
- crates/kv-ipc: native-messaging framing and the local IPC socket/pipe (moved from kestrove-desktop),
plus Listener::bind_in/connect_in and, on macOS, the App Group socket for the kestrove-nmh bundled
in Kestrove.app (Contents/Resources/kestrove-app-group).
- crates/kv-nmh: the native-messaging host, with an embedded Info.plist on macOS so it can run
sandboxed (KV_NMH_BUNDLE_ID).
- kv-ffi feature browser-bridge: broker, pairing channel and word list (moved from kestrove-desktop)
and BrowserBridge for Swift. build-apple.sh enables it and builds a universal kestrove-nmh.
- RUSTSEC-2026-0381/0382: rustls-webpki 0.103.16, webpki-roots 1.0.10 (distrusted emSign roots).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <[email protected]>
uniffi 0.32 no longer depends on bincode (RUSTSEC-2025-0141) or paste
(RUSTSEC-2024-0436), so their ignores go. basic-toml (RUSTSEC-2026-0374)
stays: askama_derive 0.16 in uniffi_bindgen 0.32 still pulls it in.
kv-ffi compiles unchanged; regenerated Swift/Kotlin bindings need no
caller changes in kestrove-apple or kestrove-android.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <[email protected]>
No known vulnerability and no safe upgrade; only askama_derive 0.12 in uniffi_bindgen 0.28's code generator uses it. Goes away with a uniffi upgrade.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <[email protected]>
Ignored like the other live test: a phone denied while pending keeps its
identity over a reinstall and a fresh Add-a-device QR signs it straight in as
a new device. Passed against kestrove-server reenroll 62fe35d.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <[email protected]>
kv-sync: SyncError::DeviceRevoked for 403 device_revoked (drops the session);
the test server answers it after OPAQUE (before the ticket) and for valid
signatures by a revoked device's key.
kv-ffi: CoreError::DeviceRevoked; the foreign DeviceSigner gains reset() (new key
and id). On device_revoked the core resets the identity, forgets the session
and the kept OPAQUE input (no silent re-enrolment) and keeps the vault data; a
login carrying a ticket retries once as the new device. reset_device_identity()
runs the reset on demand. Signed calls (sync, devices, tickets, join) reset too.
kv-wasm: DeviceRevoked; the browser binding replaces the WebCrypto key and id in
IndexedDB (same name and platform), loginWithSetup retries once with a ticket;
resetDeviceIdentity().
Tests: end to end revoked -> reset -> re-enrol with the same ticket (kv-ffi and
web core), no-ticket path, in-browser IndexedDB reset.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <[email protected]>
Google Play requires 16 KB page-size support for apps targeting Android 15+.
The 64-bit builds happened to be 16 KB-aligned by toolchain default, but
armeabi-v7a was 4 KB. Pin -z max-page-size=16384 for all Android targets.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <[email protected]>
Mirrors kv-ffi's docs/10 §5 API in WebCore and binds it under the names the web app codes
against: setupPayloadForKit, addDevicePayload, revokeEnrollmentTicket, loginWithSetup,
joinStart/joinPoll/joinCancel, joinApprove, joinSend, and the free function parseSetupPayload
(also callable through the worker client).
Unlike kv-ffi, the Secret Key is not persisted: every unlock on the web takes it, so it is
kept zeroized in the unlocked state and dropped on lock. loginWithSetup refuses a code for a
different server than the configured origin (the browser only talks to its own origin).
Tests: ticket enrollment and scan-to-join in both roles against kv-ffi via the kv-sync test
server, a swapped-approver rejection, a Chrome test (IndexedDB never holds the Secret Key,
JS shapes, error codes) and a Node smoke check of the built package.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <[email protected]>
New crate crates/kv-wasm runs the same crypto, item model and sync engine in the browser:
- WebStore: in-memory replica of kv-store's Store, each changed entry written to IndexedDB
(ciphertext only) before the JS call resolves.
- Device key: non-extractable WebCrypto ECDSA P-256 key in IndexedDB (raw r||s signatures).
- WebCore mirrors kv-ffi's VaultCore; wasm-bindgen surface in camelCase with TypeScript types,
plus a Web Worker wrapper (connectVault) so Argon2id never blocks the page.
- Tests: Chrome (IndexedDB, WebCrypto, RFC 9421 verify), shared envelope fixtures both ways
with kv-ffi, native sync with kv-ffi via the test server, Node smoke of the built package.
Small changes to shared crates so they build for wasm32:
- kv-store: SqliteStore moved to a native-only module.
- kv-sync: rustls/pinning/tokio native only (fetch on wasm); DeviceSigner::sign_async (default
wraps sign) used by ApiClient; unix_now() instead of SystemTime/now_utc.
- kv-model: Public Suffix List behind a default `psl` feature (kv-ffi keeps it; the web build
drops ~0.9 MB of code and matches same-host only).
- wasm-release profile (opt-level z, Argon2 at 3) and a wasm CI job.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <[email protected]>
* kv-proto: ticket and join wire types, LoginFinish.ticket, b64_opt.
* kv-crypto: pairing.rs (HPKE AuthPSK seal/open with the QR secret as PSK, SAS code).
* kv-sync: onboarding.rs (kestrove://setup/v1 and kestrove://join/v1 codec with
strict validation), ApiClient ticket/join calls and login_with_ticket, test
server support for tickets and rendezvous.
* kv-ffi: parse/encode_setup_payload, setup_payload_for_kit, add_device_payload,
revoke_enrollment_ticket, login_with_setup, join_start/poll/cancel,
join_approve/send. The Secret Key is kept locally, HPKE-sealed to enc_pk.
* Tests: codec round trips and rejections, AuthPSK tamper cases, end-to-end
Add-device QR and scan-to-join between two clients, forged bundles, bound
tickets; live test extended with scan-to-join.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <[email protected]>
- deny.toml: allow-wildcard-paths for the workspace's own path crates; ignore two
unmaintained notices for uniffi 0.28's build-time deps (bincode, paste).
- build-android.sh ran uniffi-bindgen on libkv_ffi.dylib, which doesn't exist on the
Linux CI runner; pick .so there.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <[email protected]>
envelope_json, manifest_decode, item_replay, secret_key_parse, totp_parse, url_match,
with seeds. fuzz/README.md records the runs (and the server/desktop targets), the two
bugs fixed in the previous commits, dependency-policy results, CI changes and the
deploy check.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <[email protected]>
next_version() and the two merge paths in the engine computed max(seq) + 1 on seq
values read from decrypted plaintext. A version carrying seq = u64::MAX panicked in
debug builds and wrapped to 0 in release, so the next save looked like a replay to
every other device. Found while checking fuzz/item_replay; needs an authentic
plaintext, so low severity.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <[email protected]>
parse() checked the cleaned key's byte length and then split it at byte 26, which
panics when a multibyte character straddles that index (found by
fuzz/secret_key_parse). Under panic = "abort" this would crash the app on a
mistyped or pasted Secret Key.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <[email protected]>
New module crates/kv-ffi/src/passkeys.rs; lib.rs only gains the mod/pub use lines.
Tests verify registrations and assertions like an RP (ciborium + p256), check RP isolation,
reopening the vault and use on a second device after a sync.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <[email protected]>
Tombstones carried no ciphertext, so the server could forge a delete (hiding
an item), and a device that pulled one accepted the next live version without
a seq comparison (delete-then-replay rollback).
* A delete is sealed like an item (same AAD and padding) with plaintext
{id, seq, deleted: true}; seq = working/base seq + 1. DELETE carries it as
the ItemPut body; the test server stores and serves it.
* replay: Base is None | LegacyTombstone | Sealed(plaintext). check_pulled
refuses a record without ciphertext, a deleted flag that disagrees with the
plaintext, or a tombstone naming another item, then requires seq to grow
for tombstones too. The `restores` exception is gone: edit beats delete
re-seals with max(edit, tombstone) + 1. next_version returns just seq.
* Legacy: a pulled tombstone without ciphertext is an integrity alarm (cannot
be told apart from a forgery). A pending legacy delete is sealed on push; a
legacy tombstone already held as base is accepted as unknown seq.
* engine: open_sealed, seal_tombstone; next_local_version -> u64. Merkle leaf
hashes a sealed tombstone's envelope like a live record's.
* kv-model Item: `restores` removed. kv-ffi delete_item seals the tombstone;
FFI surface unchanged.
* Tests: forged (unsealed and relabelled) tombstones raise an integrity alarm
(kv-sync and kv-ffi), replay after a tombstone, replays of the tombstone and
of the restore, legacy pending delete, shared item_replay.json table; the
live test now deletes an item through the real server.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <[email protected]>
A malicious server could re-serve an old but valid envelope of an item under
a new, higher revision: the AAD does not bind the revision and the Merkle
root was only checked when head_revision == cursor. The client took it as
the latest version, rolled the item back and signed over it in its next
manifest.
* kv-model Item: `seq: u64` (serde default 0) and `restores: Option<u64>`.
* kv-sync replay module: pure decision rules (check_successor,
next_version, stamp, same_content). Every pulled live record must
authenticate and have seq > the base's seq, unless it carries
restores = t with base_revision < t < revision (edit beat a delete this
device never saw) or is identical to the base. Otherwise: Integrity alarm.
Tombstones and items without a base pass.
* engine: check on every pulled record; edit-beats-delete re-seals with
restores = tombstone revision; merges write seq = max + 1 and adopt the
remote version when only seq/restores differ. Public
engine::next_local_version gives the seq/restores for a local save
(used by kv-ffi save_item and the tests).
* verify_manifest checks the Merkle root whenever no held item is newer
than head_revision (previously only at head == cursor).
* Tests: replay alarm (clean and pending receivers, plus kv-ffi), harmless
replay of the current version, tampered envelope, concurrent equal-seq
edits across three devices, edit-beats-delete with a device that skipped
the tombstone and a later replay of the restore, legacy items without seq,
hidden item with cursor past the manifest head, and the shared
item_replay.json decision table.
* gen-vectors: envelope vector item payload now includes seq.
FFI surface unchanged.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <[email protected]>
The transport already restricts to TLS 1.3 (docs/02); dropping the tls12
feature keeps TLS 1.2 code out of the binary entirely.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <[email protected]>
kv-store: SQLite (bundled) and in-memory Store holding only ciphertext
envelopes, with base copies for three-way merges and a 10-version history.
kv-ffi: VaultCore::open(path); persisted account record; local unlock key
(enable/unlock_with_local_key/disable); async sync API (configure_server,
set_device_signer, register_account, login, sync_now, logout, devices);
DeviceSigner foreign trait; IntegrityAlarm/PinMismatch/... error variants.
kv-sync: reqwest + rustls (TLS 1.3 only, ring) with SPKI pinning; OPAQUE
client on kv-proto's OpaqueSuite; RFC 9421 signing per kv_proto::httpsig;
pull/push with If-Match, field-level three-way merge, edit-beats-delete;
signed manifest (canonical CBOR, Merkle root, prev chain, Ed25519) with
rollback/fork/Merkle checks as hard integrity alarms. Tested against a
wiremock fake server, plus an #[ignore] test against kestrove-server.
kv-crypto: gen-vectors example and tests reproducing kestrove-spec/vectors.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <[email protected]>
A new device needs account_id and the KDF params to derive AUTH_INPUT
before it can build KE1, so they cannot come only from login/start.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <[email protected]>
Adds the OpaqueSuite (Ristretto255 OPRF, TripleDH, SHA-512, identity KSF)
shared by client and server, the httpsig signature-base builders, and the
setup/credentials/account/device/SSE types for milestone M1.
Cargo.lock changes only for kv-proto's new dependencies.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <[email protected]>
The first base32 symbol carries 3 data bits (26 symbols = 130 bits, 2 spare),
but decode only accepted values 0-3, so ~half of generated keys failed to parse.
Adds an edge-case test, rustfmt config, Cargo.lock, and on-demand cross targets
instead of installing all seven in rust-toolchain.toml.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <[email protected]>
samiandClaude Opus 5.5