kv-sync: SyncError::DeviceRevoked for 403 device_revoked (drops the session);
the test server answers it after OPAQUE (before the ticket) and for valid
signatures by a revoked device's key.
kv-ffi: CoreError::DeviceRevoked; the foreign DeviceSigner gains reset() (new key
and id). On device_revoked the core resets the identity, forgets the session
and the kept OPAQUE input (no silent re-enrolment) and keeps the vault data; a
login carrying a ticket retries once as the new device. reset_device_identity()
runs the reset on demand. Signed calls (sync, devices, tickets, join) reset too.
kv-wasm: DeviceRevoked; the browser binding replaces the WebCrypto key and id in
IndexedDB (same name and platform), loginWithSetup retries once with a ticket;
resetDeviceIdentity().
Tests: end to end revoked -> reset -> re-enrol with the same ticket (kv-ffi and
web core), no-ticket path, in-browser IndexedDB reset.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <[email protected]>
* kv-proto: ticket and join wire types, LoginFinish.ticket, b64_opt.
* kv-crypto: pairing.rs (HPKE AuthPSK seal/open with the QR secret as PSK, SAS code).
* kv-sync: onboarding.rs (kestrove://setup/v1 and kestrove://join/v1 codec with
strict validation), ApiClient ticket/join calls and login_with_ticket, test
server support for tickets and rendezvous.
* kv-ffi: parse/encode_setup_payload, setup_payload_for_kit, add_device_payload,
revoke_enrollment_ticket, login_with_setup, join_start/poll/cancel,
join_approve/send. The Secret Key is kept locally, HPKE-sealed to enc_pk.
* Tests: codec round trips and rejections, AuthPSK tamper cases, end-to-end
Add-device QR and scan-to-join between two clients, forged bundles, bound
tickets; live test extended with scan-to-join.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <[email protected]>
samiandClaude Opus 5.5