samiandClaude Sonnet 5
092e99f7a0
util/crc32.hpp — header-only CRC-32 (zlib polynomial, reflected), used to integrity-check the sidecar. meta/veloxpart — the <name>.veloxpart.meta resume file (docs/04 §5). Little-endian, versioned, CRC-32 over the whole record. Layout: magic, version, flags, total_size, downloaded, url set (original/effective/ mirrors), etag/last-modified/content-type, segment records (start, end INCLUSIVE, completed), optional sha256 streaming-hash blob. parse_veloxpart() is the attacker-facing surface (the file sits in a world-writable-ish download dir) and is total on any byte string: CRC checked before any field is interpreted; magic, a version it understands, every count and length bounded by a hard cap AND checked against the remaining buffer; ByteReader latches on overrun; trailing bytes rejected. Every malformation is meta_corrupt / meta_version_unsupported, never a crash or an unbounded allocation. serialize_veloxpart() is deterministic (unchanged sidecar isn't rewritten). File helpers write atomically (temp + rename) and fdatasync the file and its directory. Tests: crc32 known vector; full + minimal round-trips; deterministic serialize; file round-trip; and a truncation/corruption table — bad magic, CRC mismatch (payload and CRC-field flips), future version, truncation at every stage, hostile url_count / segment_count / lp_string length (the case the brief singles out), trailing bytes, impossible segment.completed. tools/fuzz/fuzz_veloxpart — feeds raw bytes and bytes-with-valid-CRC (so the field parser and ByteReader bounds checks are actually reached), and round-trip-stability-checks anything accepted. Ran 1.1M execs clean under ASan+UBSan+libFuzzer (clang++-21); fuzz_content_disposition and fuzz_url likewise re-run to 1.1M. tools/fuzz gains a -runs=0 seed-replay CTest smoke per target (regression tripwire; the campaign stays manual). Fuzz-found and fixed: parse_content_disposition could emit a filename containing NUL / control bytes from a mangled filename* ext-value — strip_path only removed path separators. Now sanitize_leaf() also drops C0 controls and DEL (rules/ still owns the authoritative sanitize; `..` and printable-unsafe content pass through as before). Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <[email protected]> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01HPPSGhiArbvQgwC2DNiURS
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VDMP |