Commit Graph
3 Commits
Author SHA1 Message Date
samiandClaude Sonnet 5 08d7ee9263 daemon: wire the engine into veloxd — the vertical slice runs end to end
CORE stage 8 merged, so vdm::Engine is linkable. This closes D4a and
narrows D4b: `velox add <url>` now actually downloads.

- sched/engine_port_core.hpp — the real EnginePort: forwards to a live
  vdm::Engine, keeps the DownloadHandle per task for pause/resume/
  cancel/provide_auth/decide/refresh_url, drives set_task_order /
  set_max_active_segments / set_host_segment_cap via
  engine.segment_budget(). CORE confirmed the admission model: DAEMON
  decides when to start(); the engine's own download_task calls
  register_task/set_want internally — DAEMON never touches per-task
  budget calls. EnginePort gains release(TaskId) so the port drops a
  handle when the task goes terminal.
- rpc/event_loop — EventLoop::post(fn): thread-safe, runs fn on the
  loop thread next iteration. The marshaller for engine-thread
  callbacks.
- main.cpp — constructs vdm::Engine + EnginePortCore + Scheduler
  (post_to_loop = loop.post). At startup: reconcile_after_restart()
  (ADR 0013 §5), reload_config(), tick(). A 1 s timerfd on the loop
  re-runs tick() (schedule windows, missed nudges); download.add nudges
  via dispatcher.set_on_mutation.

End-to-end verified against tools/testserver: `velox add
http://127.0.0.1:.../file/512K` -> task queued -> scheduler admits ->
engine downloads 524288 bytes -> complete, file on disk. First
byte-path all the way through the project.

safepath-adversarial.md: re-verified per its own note — CORE landed
O_NOFOLLOW on the target open (core/src/io/sparse_file.cpp), so the
leaf-symlink TOCTOU is now closed; residual is down to one
intermediate-dir gap (documented post-M1 chase).

36 daemon/cli tests green; scheduler + uds_roundtrip TSan-clean.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <[email protected]>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Upd9WhG9oppieig5nRDLig
2026-09-10 20:36:11 +04:00
samiandClaude Sonnet 5 7514f5a4c4 daemon: correct an unverified cross-lane claim in safepath-adversarial.md
The residual section claimed the leaf/component TOCTOU is "closed in
practice by CORE's O_NOFOLLOW open of the final file". Verified: it is
not — core/src/io/sparse_file.cpp:77 opens O_WRONLY|O_CREAT|O_CLOEXEC,
no O_NOFOLLOW, no O_EXCL. Requested the flags from CORE via PKG/QA.

Doc now states the residual is currently OPEN, names the file:line and
flags checked and the date, says what actually limits exposure today
(0700 parent dirs), and flags this as the boundary where a reader
stops checking. Step 5 reworded the same way. Re-verify the flags when
the CORE change lands.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <[email protected]>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Upd9WhG9oppieig5nRDLig
2026-09-10 19:49:51 +04:00
samiandClaude Sonnet 5 ab479e7885 daemon: fs/safepath — the saveDir/filename path-traversal boundary (security)
veloxd is the one process that turns an untrusted string into a
filesystem destination, and via capture.offer that string can come
from a web page. CLAUDE.md §4 and the M1 DoD both name this.

daemon/docs/safepath-adversarial.md is the spec, written before the
code the way EXT did for shouldCapture: 21 rows — .. traversal
(A1/A2), absolute-outside-roots (A3), prefix-match confusion (A4),
symlink-out (A7), TOCTOU on a created tail (A8), NUL/control bytes in
the leaf that CORE's fuzzer hit through Content-Disposition (A9/A10),
degenerate and overlong leaves (A11/A13), overlong dir component
(A14), symlinked root (A16), destination-is-a-file (A17), and the
legitimate cases that must still pass — non-ASCII (A18), redundant "."
(A19), trailing space/dot trimming (A20).

fs/safepath.cpp:
- sanitize_leaf: strip <0x20 and 0x7F, trim ws, strip trailing dots,
  reject ""/"."/".."/contains-'/', cap 255 UTF-8 bytes on a codepoint
  boundary. Mirrors core/src/net/content_disposition.cpp.
- canonicalize_root: expand ~ and realpath each allowedRoots entry
  once, so a symlinked root resolves to its target.
- resolve_target: reject relative saveDir and any ".." component
  lexically; if the dir exists, realpath + component-wise containment
  (a symlink that escapes is caught, one that stays inside passes); if
  a tail is missing, realpath+check the deepest existing ancestor then
  create the tail via an openat/mkdirat O_NOFOLLOW walk and re-derive
  the final path from the fd. Every failure is -32011 with data.path =
  the *original* saveDir (never the resolved path). Residual TOCTOU on
  a pre-existing intermediate dir is documented and closed by CORE's
  O_NOFOLLOW open of the file.

veloxd_fs static lib; veloxd_rpc links it for the download.add wiring
next. Test veloxd.safepath is the adversarial table, on a real temp
tree. ASan+UBSan and TSan clean; 33 daemon/cli tests green.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <[email protected]>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Upd9WhG9oppieig5nRDLig
2026-09-10 19:37:01 +04:00