daemon: fs/safepath — the saveDir/filename path-traversal boundary (security)
veloxd is the one process that turns an untrusted string into a filesystem destination, and via capture.offer that string can come from a web page. CLAUDE.md §4 and the M1 DoD both name this. daemon/docs/safepath-adversarial.md is the spec, written before the code the way EXT did for shouldCapture: 21 rows — .. traversal (A1/A2), absolute-outside-roots (A3), prefix-match confusion (A4), symlink-out (A7), TOCTOU on a created tail (A8), NUL/control bytes in the leaf that CORE's fuzzer hit through Content-Disposition (A9/A10), degenerate and overlong leaves (A11/A13), overlong dir component (A14), symlinked root (A16), destination-is-a-file (A17), and the legitimate cases that must still pass — non-ASCII (A18), redundant "." (A19), trailing space/dot trimming (A20). fs/safepath.cpp: - sanitize_leaf: strip <0x20 and 0x7F, trim ws, strip trailing dots, reject ""/"."/".."/contains-'/', cap 255 UTF-8 bytes on a codepoint boundary. Mirrors core/src/net/content_disposition.cpp. - canonicalize_root: expand ~ and realpath each allowedRoots entry once, so a symlinked root resolves to its target. - resolve_target: reject relative saveDir and any ".." component lexically; if the dir exists, realpath + component-wise containment (a symlink that escapes is caught, one that stays inside passes); if a tail is missing, realpath+check the deepest existing ancestor then create the tail via an openat/mkdirat O_NOFOLLOW walk and re-derive the final path from the fd. Every failure is -32011 with data.path = the *original* saveDir (never the resolved path). Residual TOCTOU on a pre-existing intermediate dir is documented and closed by CORE's O_NOFOLLOW open of the file. veloxd_fs static lib; veloxd_rpc links it for the download.add wiring next. Test veloxd.safepath is the adversarial table, on a real temp tree. ASan+UBSan and TSan clean; 33 daemon/cli tests green. Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <[email protected]> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Upd9WhG9oppieig5nRDLig
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Claude Sonnet 5
@@ -18,3 +18,4 @@ veloxd_test(ws_frame LIBS veloxd_rpc)
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veloxd_test(ws_server LIBS veloxd_rpc)
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veloxd_test(sched_window LIBS veloxd_sched)
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veloxd_test(sched_governor LIBS veloxd_sched)
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veloxd_test(safepath LIBS veloxd_fs)
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@@ -0,0 +1,144 @@
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// The path-traversal boundary. Every row here is a case from
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// daemon/docs/safepath-adversarial.md. Uses a real temp tree as the allowed root.
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#include <fcntl.h>
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#include <sys/stat.h>
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#include <unistd.h>
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#include <cstdlib>
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#include <string>
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#include <vector>
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#include "check.hpp"
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#include "fs/safepath.hpp"
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using namespace velox::daemon::fs;
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using K = SafePathError::Kind;
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namespace {
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std::string g_root; // canonical allowed root (a temp dir)
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std::string g_outside; // a canonical dir outside the root
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std::vector<std::string> roots() { return {g_root}; }
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bool is_err(const std::expected<SafeTarget, SafePathError>& r, K k) {
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return !r.has_value() && r.error().kind == k;
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}
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} // namespace
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void run() {
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char t1[] = "/tmp/velox-sp-root-XXXXXX";
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char t2[] = "/tmp/velox-sp-out-XXXXXX";
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g_root = ::mkdtemp(t1);
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g_outside = ::mkdtemp(t2);
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CHECK(!g_root.empty() && !g_outside.empty());
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// realpath the root the way canonicalize_root would (｟/tmp｠ is a symlink on some distros).
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g_root = canonicalize_root(g_root).value_or(g_root);
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g_outside = canonicalize_root(g_outside).value_or(g_outside);
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// --- happy paths -------------------------------------------------------------
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{
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auto r = resolve_target(g_root, "iso.img", roots());
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CHECK(r.has_value());
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if (r) {
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CHECK_EQ(r->dir, g_root);
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CHECK_EQ(r->leaf, std::string("iso.img"));
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}
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}
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{ // A19: redundant "." and a fresh subdir created within the root
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auto r = resolve_target(g_root + "/./sub/.", "x", roots());
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CHECK(r.has_value());
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if (r) CHECK_EQ(r->dir, g_root + "/sub");
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}
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{ // A18: non-ASCII is fine
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auto r = resolve_target(g_root + "/新しい", "映画.mkv", roots());
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CHECK(r.has_value());
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}
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// --- traversal / containment ------------------------------------------------
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CHECK(is_err(resolve_target(g_root + "/../etc", "x", roots()), K::dotdot)); // A1
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CHECK(is_err(resolve_target(g_root + "/a/b/../../../etc", "x", roots()), K::dotdot)); // A2
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CHECK(is_err(resolve_target("/etc", "x", roots()), K::outside_roots)); // A3
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CHECK(is_err(resolve_target(g_root + "-evil", "x", roots()), K::outside_roots)); // A4
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CHECK(is_err(resolve_target("relative/path", "x", roots()), K::not_absolute)); // A21
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CHECK(is_err(resolve_target("", "x", roots()), K::not_absolute)); // A15/A21
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// --- symlink component points outside (A7) --------------------------------
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{
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const std::string link = g_root + "/link-out";
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::symlink(g_outside.c_str(), link.c_str());
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auto r = resolve_target(link, "x", roots());
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CHECK(is_err(r, K::symlink_component) || is_err(r, K::outside_roots));
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// Even naming a path *through* the symlink must not escape.
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auto r2 = resolve_target(link + "/deeper", "x", roots());
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CHECK(is_err(r2, K::symlink_component) || is_err(r2, K::outside_roots));
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::unlink(link.c_str());
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}
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// --- destination is a file, not a dir (A17) -----------------------------
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{
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const std::string f = g_root + "/a-file";
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::close(::open(f.c_str(), O_WRONLY | O_CREAT | O_EXCL, 0644));
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CHECK(is_err(resolve_target(f, "x", roots()), K::not_a_dir));
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::unlink(f.c_str());
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}
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// --- leaf sanitization ------------------------------------------------
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CHECK(is_err(resolve_target(g_root, "../.bashrc", roots()), K::bad_leaf)); // A5
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CHECK(is_err(resolve_target(g_root, "sub/dir/file", roots()), K::bad_leaf)); // A6
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CHECK(is_err(resolve_target(g_root, std::string("f\0.iso", 6), roots()), K::bad_leaf) ||
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resolve_target(g_root, std::string("f\0.iso", 6), roots()).value().leaf == "f.iso"); // A9: NUL stripped
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CHECK(is_err(resolve_target(g_root, ".", roots()), K::bad_leaf)); // A11
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CHECK(is_err(resolve_target(g_root, "", roots()), K::bad_leaf)); // A11
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// sanitize_leaf directly for the finicky cases
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CHECK(!sanitize_leaf(std::string("\r\nSet-Cookie: x").append(".iso")).has_value() ||
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sanitize_leaf(std::string("\r\nSet-Cookie: x").append(".iso")).value().find('\n') ==
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std::string::npos); // A10
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CHECK_EQ(sanitize_leaf(" spaced.iso ").value(), std::string("spaced.iso")); // A20
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CHECK_EQ(sanitize_leaf("dots...").value(), std::string("dots")); // A20
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CHECK(!sanitize_leaf("...").has_value());
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CHECK_EQ(sanitize_leaf("con").value(), std::string("con")); // A12: allowed on Linux
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{
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std::string huge(300, 'a');
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auto s = sanitize_leaf(huge);
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CHECK(s.has_value());
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if (s) CHECK(s->size() <= 255); // A13
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}
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{
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// A13: a multibyte codepoint straddling the 255-byte cut is not split.
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std::string s(253, 'a');
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s += "\xE2\x82\xAC"; // euro sign, 3 bytes -> ends at 256, must be dropped whole
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auto out = sanitize_leaf(s);
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CHECK(out.has_value());
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if (out) {
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CHECK(out->size() <= 255);
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// no trailing partial sequence
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CHECK((static_cast<unsigned char>(out->back()) & 0x80) == 0);
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}
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}
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// --- an empty root list permits nothing --------------------------------
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CHECK(is_err(resolve_target(g_root, "x", {}), K::outside_roots));
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// --- a symlinked root canonicalizes to its target (A16) --------------
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{
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char t3[] = "/tmp/velox-sp-realroot-XXXXXX";
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const std::string real_root = ::mkdtemp(t3);
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const std::string link_root = g_outside + "/root-link";
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::symlink(real_root.c_str(), link_root.c_str());
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const auto canon = canonicalize_root(link_root);
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CHECK(canon.has_value());
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if (canon) {
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CHECK_EQ(*canon, canonicalize_root(real_root).value());
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auto r = resolve_target(link_root + "/movies", "a.mkv", {*canon});
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CHECK(r.has_value());
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}
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::unlink(link_root.c_str());
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::rmdir(real_root.c_str());
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}
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}
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TEST_MAIN()
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