daemon: fs/safepath — the saveDir/filename path-traversal boundary (security)

veloxd is the one process that turns an untrusted string into a
filesystem destination, and via capture.offer that string can come
from a web page. CLAUDE.md §4 and the M1 DoD both name this.

daemon/docs/safepath-adversarial.md is the spec, written before the
code the way EXT did for shouldCapture: 21 rows — .. traversal
(A1/A2), absolute-outside-roots (A3), prefix-match confusion (A4),
symlink-out (A7), TOCTOU on a created tail (A8), NUL/control bytes in
the leaf that CORE's fuzzer hit through Content-Disposition (A9/A10),
degenerate and overlong leaves (A11/A13), overlong dir component
(A14), symlinked root (A16), destination-is-a-file (A17), and the
legitimate cases that must still pass — non-ASCII (A18), redundant "."
(A19), trailing space/dot trimming (A20).

fs/safepath.cpp:
- sanitize_leaf: strip <0x20 and 0x7F, trim ws, strip trailing dots,
  reject ""/"."/".."/contains-'/', cap 255 UTF-8 bytes on a codepoint
  boundary. Mirrors core/src/net/content_disposition.cpp.
- canonicalize_root: expand ~ and realpath each allowedRoots entry
  once, so a symlinked root resolves to its target.
- resolve_target: reject relative saveDir and any ".." component
  lexically; if the dir exists, realpath + component-wise containment
  (a symlink that escapes is caught, one that stays inside passes); if
  a tail is missing, realpath+check the deepest existing ancestor then
  create the tail via an openat/mkdirat O_NOFOLLOW walk and re-derive
  the final path from the fd. Every failure is -32011 with data.path =
  the *original* saveDir (never the resolved path). Residual TOCTOU on
  a pre-existing intermediate dir is documented and closed by CORE's
  O_NOFOLLOW open of the file.

veloxd_fs static lib; veloxd_rpc links it for the download.add wiring
next. Test veloxd.safepath is the adversarial table, on a real temp
tree. ASan+UBSan and TSan clean; 33 daemon/cli tests green.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <[email protected]>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Upd9WhG9oppieig5nRDLig
This commit is contained in:
2026-09-10 19:37:01 +04:00
co-authored by Claude Sonnet 5
parent 1914eed7db
commit ab479e7885
8 changed files with 528 additions and 2 deletions
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#include "fs/safepath.hpp"
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <sys/stat.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <cerrno>
#include <cstdlib>
#include <cstring>
#include <string>
#include <vector>
namespace velox::daemon::fs {
namespace {
using E = SafePathError::Kind;
std::unexpected<SafePathError> err(E kind, std::string msg) {
return std::unexpected(SafePathError{kind, std::move(msg)});
}
class Fd {
public:
Fd() = default;
explicit Fd(int fd) : fd_(fd) {}
Fd(Fd&& o) noexcept : fd_(o.fd_) { o.fd_ = -1; }
Fd& operator=(Fd&& o) noexcept {
if (this != &o) {
reset();
fd_ = o.fd_;
o.fd_ = -1;
}
return *this;
}
~Fd() { reset(); }
int get() const noexcept { return fd_; }
explicit operator bool() const noexcept { return fd_ >= 0; }
void reset() {
if (fd_ >= 0) ::close(fd_);
fd_ = -1;
}
private:
int fd_ = -1;
};
std::vector<std::string> split_components(std::string_view path) {
std::vector<std::string> out;
std::size_t i = 0;
while (i < path.size()) {
while (i < path.size() && path[i] == '/') ++i;
std::size_t j = i;
while (j < path.size() && path[j] != '/') ++j;
if (j > i) out.emplace_back(path.substr(i, j - i));
i = j;
}
return out;
}
bool within_root(const std::string& canonical, const std::vector<std::string>& roots) {
for (const auto& r : roots) {
if (canonical == r) return true;
if (canonical.size() > r.size() && canonical.compare(0, r.size(), r) == 0 &&
canonical[r.size()] == '/')
return true;
}
return false;
}
std::optional<std::string> path_of_fd(int fd) {
char link[64];
std::snprintf(link, sizeof(link), "/proc/self/fd/%d", fd);
std::string buf(256, '\0');
for (;;) {
const ssize_t n = ::readlink(link, buf.data(), buf.size());
if (n < 0) return std::nullopt;
if (static_cast<std::size_t>(n) < buf.size()) {
buf.resize(static_cast<std::size_t>(n));
return buf;
}
buf.resize(buf.size() * 2);
}
}
std::optional<std::string> do_realpath(const std::string& p) {
char* r = ::realpath(p.c_str(), nullptr);
if (r == nullptr) return std::nullopt;
std::string out(r);
::free(r);
return out;
}
// Best-effort refusal if the leaf is already present as a symlink. CORE opens the file
// O_NOFOLLOW regardless, which is what actually closes the create-after-check race.
std::optional<SafePathError> reject_symlink_leaf(int dir_fd, const std::string& leaf) {
struct stat st{};
if (::fstatat(dir_fd, leaf.c_str(), &st, AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW) == 0 && S_ISLNK(st.st_mode))
return SafePathError{E::symlink_component, "the target filename is a symlink"};
return std::nullopt;
}
} // namespace
std::optional<std::string> sanitize_leaf(std::string_view name) {
std::string out;
out.reserve(name.size());
for (unsigned char c : name) {
if (c >= 0x20 && c != 0x7F) out.push_back(static_cast<char>(c));
}
auto is_ws = [](char c) { return c == ' ' || c == '\t'; };
std::size_t b = 0;
std::size_t e = out.size();
while (b < e && is_ws(out[b])) ++b;
while (e > b && (is_ws(out[e - 1]) || out[e - 1] == '.')) --e;
out = out.substr(b, e - b);
if (out.size() > 255) {
out.resize(255);
while (!out.empty() && (static_cast<unsigned char>(out.back()) & 0xC0) == 0x80)
out.pop_back();
if (!out.empty() && (static_cast<unsigned char>(out.back()) & 0x80)) out.pop_back();
while (!out.empty() && (out.back() == '.' || out.back() == ' ')) out.pop_back();
}
if (out.empty() || out == "." || out == "..") return std::nullopt;
if (out.find('/') != std::string::npos) return std::nullopt;
return out;
}
std::optional<std::string> canonicalize_root(std::string_view configured) {
std::string p(configured);
if (p == "~" || p.rfind("~/", 0) == 0) {
const char* home = ::getenv("HOME");
if (home == nullptr || home[0] == '\0') return std::nullopt;
p = std::string(home) + (p.size() > 1 ? p.substr(1) : std::string{});
}
return do_realpath(p);
}
std::expected<SafeTarget, SafePathError> resolve_target(
std::string_view save_dir, std::string_view filename_leaf,
const std::vector<std::string>& canonical_roots) {
const auto leaf = sanitize_leaf(filename_leaf);
if (!leaf) return err(E::bad_leaf, "filename is empty or not a valid single component");
if (save_dir.empty() || save_dir.front() != '/')
return err(E::not_absolute, "saveDir must be an absolute path");
const auto comps = split_components(save_dir);
for (const auto& c : comps) {
if (c == "..") return err(E::dotdot, "saveDir must not contain a '..' component");
if (c.size() > 255) return err(E::name_too_long, "a path component is too long");
}
// Fast path: the directory already exists. realpath() follows every symlink (so a
// symlinked root or a symlinked component is resolved to where it really points), and
// the containment check is on that resolved path — a symlink that escapes a root is
// caught here (A7), one that stays inside is fine (A16).
if (auto canon = do_realpath(std::string(save_dir))) {
if (!within_root(*canon, canonical_roots))
return err(E::outside_roots, "destination resolves outside every allowed root");
Fd dir(::open(canon->c_str(), O_PATH | O_DIRECTORY | O_CLOEXEC));
if (!dir) {
if (errno == ENOTDIR) return err(E::not_a_dir, "destination is not a directory");
return err(E::io, std::string("open destination: ") + std::strerror(errno));
}
if (auto e = reject_symlink_leaf(dir.get(), *leaf)) return std::unexpected(*e);
return SafeTarget{*canon, *leaf};
}
if (errno == ENOTDIR)
return err(E::not_a_dir, "a path component is not a directory");
if (errno == ENAMETOOLONG)
return err(E::name_too_long, "the destination path is too long");
if (errno != ENOENT)
return err(E::io, std::string("realpath(saveDir): ") + std::strerror(errno));
// The directory (or a tail of it) does not exist yet. Find the deepest ancestor that
// does, canonicalise + root-check *that*, then create the missing tail through an
// O_NOFOLLOW fd walk — the tail has no symlinks because it has no components yet, and
// a race that plants one is caught by the ELOOP below and the final fd re-check.
std::vector<std::string> pending;
std::string existing(save_dir);
std::optional<std::string> anchor;
while (true) {
const auto slash = existing.find_last_of('/');
const std::string base = existing.substr(slash + 1);
existing = slash == 0 ? "/" : existing.substr(0, slash);
if (!base.empty() && base != ".") pending.push_back(base);
anchor = do_realpath(existing);
if (anchor) break;
if (errno != ENOENT)
return err(E::io, std::string("realpath(ancestor): ") + std::strerror(errno));
if (existing == "/") return err(E::io, "root does not resolve");
}
if (!within_root(*anchor, canonical_roots))
return err(E::outside_roots, "destination resolves outside every allowed root");
Fd dir(::open(anchor->c_str(), O_PATH | O_DIRECTORY | O_CLOEXEC));
if (!dir) return err(E::io, std::string("open(anchor): ") + std::strerror(errno));
std::string built = *anchor;
for (auto it = pending.rbegin(); it != pending.rend(); ++it) {
const std::string& c = *it;
if (::mkdirat(dir.get(), c.c_str(), 0777) != 0 && errno != EEXIST) {
if (errno == ENAMETOOLONG)
return err(E::name_too_long, "a path component is too long: " + c);
return err(E::io, "mkdirat(" + c + "): " + std::strerror(errno));
}
Fd next(::openat(dir.get(), c.c_str(), O_PATH | O_DIRECTORY | O_NOFOLLOW | O_CLOEXEC));
if (!next) {
if (errno == ELOOP)
return err(E::symlink_component, "a path component was raced to a symlink: " + c);
if (errno == ENOTDIR)
return err(E::not_a_dir, "a path component is not a directory: " + c);
return err(E::io, "openat(" + c + "): " + std::strerror(errno));
}
dir = std::move(next);
built += "/" + c;
}
const auto final_canon = path_of_fd(dir.get());
if (!final_canon) return err(E::io, "could not resolve the created directory");
if (!within_root(*final_canon, canonical_roots))
return err(E::outside_roots, "destination resolves outside every allowed root");
if (auto e = reject_symlink_leaf(dir.get(), *leaf)) return std::unexpected(*e);
return SafeTarget{*final_canon, *leaf};
}
} // namespace velox::daemon::fs
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#pragma once
// Turns an untrusted (saveDir, filename) into a verified filesystem destination, or a
// -32011. This is the process's one path-traversal boundary: the string can come from a
// web page via capture.offer, or from any same-UID process via download.add.
//
// The rules and every adversarial case are in daemon/docs/safepath-adversarial.md, which
// was written before this header. In short: sanitize the leaf in isolation; require an
// absolute saveDir with no ".." component; walk it component-by-component with
// openat(O_NOFOLLOW) (never stat-then-open), creating missing tail dirs with mkdirat;
// then re-derive the final directory's canonical path from its fd and assert it is inside
// a canonical allowed root, component-wise.
#include <expected>
#include <optional>
#include <string>
#include <string_view>
#include <vector>
namespace velox::daemon::fs {
struct SafePathError {
enum class Kind {
not_absolute, // saveDir is relative or empty
dotdot, // saveDir contains a ".." component
outside_roots, // resolves outside every allowed root
symlink_component, // a path component (or the leaf) is a symlink
not_a_dir, // a component exists and is not a directory
bad_leaf, // filename empty / "." / ".." / contains '/' / all control bytes
name_too_long, // a component exceeds the filesystem limit
io, // any other errno from the walk
};
Kind kind = Kind::io;
std::string message;
};
// A verified destination. `dir` is absolute, canonical (symlink-free), exists as a
// directory, and is inside an allowed root. `leaf` is a sanitized single component.
struct SafeTarget {
std::string dir;
std::string leaf;
std::string full() const { return dir + "/" + leaf; }
};
// Sanitize one filename component: drop bytes < 0x20 and 0x7F, trim surrounding
// whitespace, strip trailing dots and spaces, reject ""/"."/".."/contains-'/', and cap at
// 255 bytes of UTF-8 without splitting a codepoint. Returns nullopt on reject.
std::optional<std::string> sanitize_leaf(std::string_view name);
// Expand a leading "~" (to $HOME) and realpath() a configured root. Call once per entry in
// saveTo.allowedRoots at startup / on settings.set; the result is what resolve_target
// compares against. nullopt if the path does not currently resolve.
std::optional<std::string> canonicalize_root(std::string_view configured);
// The gate. `save_dir` must be absolute and free of ".."; it is created (like `mkdir -p`)
// if missing, but only ever inside a canonical root and only via an O_NOFOLLOW walk.
// `filename_leaf` is sanitized here. `canonical_roots` is canonicalize_root() applied to
// every allowed root (empty => nothing is permitted).
std::expected<SafeTarget, SafePathError> resolve_target(
std::string_view save_dir, std::string_view filename_leaf,
const std::vector<std::string>& canonical_roots);
} // namespace velox::daemon::fs
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